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For many years, the dominant theoretical framework guiding research into the neural origins of perceptual expe-
rience has been provided by hierarchical feedforward models, in which sensory inputs are passed through a series
of increasingly complex feature detectors. However, the long-standing orthodoxy of these accounts has recently
been challenged by a radically different set of theories that contend that perception arises from a purely inferen-
tial process supported by two distinct classes of neurons: those that transmit predictions about sensory states and
those that signal sensory information that deviates from those predictions. Although these predictive processing
(PP) models have become increasingly influential in cognitive neuroscience, they are also criticized for lacking the
empirical support to justify their status. This limited evidence base partly reflects the considerable methodological
challenges that are presented when trying to test the unique predictions of these models. However, a confluence of
technological and theoretical advances has prompted a recent surge in human and nonhuman neurophysiological
research seeking to fill this empirical gap. Here, we will review this new research and evaluate the degree to which
its findings support the key claims of PP.
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Introduction
Our immersion in a seamless and coherent per-
ceptual experience veils the reality that it must be
assembled from a sea of noisy and ambiguous sen-
sory information.1–3 It wasHelmholtz who first pro-
posed that perception does not obediently reflect
the sensory inputs that undergird it, as exposed in
myriad perceptual illusions,4–6 but arises from an
inferential process in which stimuli are interpreted
in light of our past experiences. Quite how this is
achieved in the brain is still hotly debated.7–11 Thus
far, the dominant framework guiding empirical
research has been provided by feedforward models,
which contend that our perceptual experience is
assembled by a series of spatiotemporal filters that
extract increasingly complex stimulus features as
sensory information ascends through the cortical
hierarchy.12–14 These traditional models account
for the influence of prior knowledge on perception
by invoking a variety of processing strategies and
computational heuristics15,16 (e.g., the inhibition
of short-range by long-range motion signals to
solve the correspondence problem) that are tai-
lored for particular sensory features and contexts.
The success of feedforward models in accom-
modating neurophysiological and anatomical
observations has established them as the orthodox
perspective on sensory processing. In recent years,
however, a growing contingent of scholars has
entertained a radical new framework that casts per-
ception as an entirely inferential process in which
predictions about the outside world shape infor-
mation processing at all levels of the cortical
hierarchy.1,4,9,17–19
Predictive processing (PP) claims that the brain
confronts the inherent ambiguity in sensory input
by assembling “generative models” of the causes
underlying sensory events. Generative models yield
doi: 10.1111/nyas.14321
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Figure 1. A simplified hierarchical PPmodel based on the circuit proposed by Rao and Ballard.18 Here, each level is composed of
a population of reciprocally connected expectation units (Ex) and error units (Er). Expectation units signal the expected pattern of
activity at the preceding level, given the current perceptual hypotheses.Where discrepancies emerge between these sensory expec-
tations and sensory-driven input, prediction errors are fed forward to the subsequent level to inform the revisions of prediction
necessary to minimize prediction error.
predictions about the pattern of sensory input
that would be expected if the model’s estimate of
the cause was correct. According to the dominant
neural process account of PP, known as predic-
tive coding,18 these predictions are sent cascading
down the processing hierarchy, suppressing con-
gruent incoming sensory signals, such that only
the residual, unexplained components of sensory
information remain to be fed forward to higher
levels in the form of “prediction error.” The brain’s
generative models continuously exploit these error
signals to revise the probability assigned to percep-
tual hypotheses as this iterative process plays out
across all levels of the processing hierarchy, until the
network converges on a consistent representation
of sensory causes. From this perspective, percep-
tion is the process of identifying the perceptual
hypothesis that best predicts sensory input and
hence, minimizes prediction error.9,20
PP claims that this process is neurophysio-
logically instantiated in an inferential hierarchy
composed of two functionally distinct neural sub-
populations: expectation units that communicate
expected sensory states downward and laterally
within the processing hierarchy, and error units
that feed prediction error signals upward and
laterally9 (Fig. 1). Importantly, prediction errors
are not regarded as general surprise or arousal
signals but rather, the source, connectivity, and
stimulus preferences of an error unit imbue its
output with specific information about the nature
of the mismatch between predicted and actual
input.21 Thus, where traditional models propose
that forward signals emanating from primary visual
cortex (V1) directly reflect stimulus orientation, PP
proposes that they exclusively encode deviations
from an expected orientation. Equivalently, where
traditional models propose that inferotemporal
cortex (IT) detects object identities, PP proposes
that its error units signal only unpredicted object
identities. In other words, PP hinges on an inversion
of classical feedforward accounts whereby it is the
descending signals that provide representations of
the external world while forward signals provide
the feedback that modifies those representations.
Thus, PP has at its core a process of “predicting
the present,” in which top-down flows attempt
to match incoming sensory stimulations, but they
achieve this goal using information that spansmany
windows of space and timea.
To be effective, a PP system cannot treat all
prediction error signals equally: sensory data can
fail to conform to expectations because those
expectations are incorrect or because the data
are noisy or unreliable.21,23 According to PP, the
brain addresses this by adjusting the influence of
particular sources of prediction error on percep-
tual hypotheses according to an estimate of the
relative reliability associated with sensory evidence
(i.e., sensory precision) and with higher-level
representations (i.e., prior precision).9,24,25 The
“precision-weighting” assigned to prediction error
is encoded in the synaptic gain applied to the asso-
ciated error units, such that high-precision errors
exert greater influence in commanding revisions of
perceptual hypotheses, while current predictions
are more stubborn in the face of low-precision
aRecent work in the area also looks at even longer win-
dows, selecting policies that aim to reduce expected future
prediction error (see Ref. 22).
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errors.26 Hence, precision-weighting provides a
mechanism through which the brain can promote
the influence of error channels that will provide
the most valuable information in revising sensory
expectations (see “Precision and attention” section).
A compelling feature of PP models is that they
specify a single mechanism that naturally accounts
for a range of prominent perceptual and neural phe-
nomena ranging from end-stopping18 to repetition
suppression (RS) and error responses,27 atten-
tional modulations of sensory signals,28 bistable
perception,29 and motion illusions.30,31 But perhaps
the most seductive aspect of these models is their
apparent potential to provide a unified theory of
the mind, with several theorists suggesting that
hierarchical inference is the fundamental mecha-
nism underlying all neural computation1,9,17,19,21,32
(see Ref. 23 for a critical review). However, an
oft-repeated criticism of PP is that it simply lacks
the empirical foundation to undergird these grand
claims10,33–36 (see commentaries on Ref. 17). In
reality, many of the perceptual and neurophysio-
logical phenomena that are regularly highlighted as
evidence in favor of PP can also be accommodated
within traditional models by invoking additional
mechanisms (e.g., neural adaptation in the case of
RS). Most of PP’s unique predictions relate to fine-
grained neuronal and circuit-level phenomena that
require carefully tailored behavioral paradigms and
sensitive neural assays. A variety of PP-consistent
modelsb have been proposed,2,9,18,37–41 but despite
this heterogeneity, there are a number of shared,
canonical features that clearly dissociate PP from
traditional models of perception. To date, neu-
rophysiological investigations of PP have largely
centered around testing four key hypotheses:
1. Error-signaling neural responses to sensory
stimuli should scale inversely with expecta-
tion.
bNote that there are other biologically plausible accounts
of predictive processing (e.g., belief propagation and vari-
ational message passing), which many take to be synony-
mous with active inference, although they would not nec-
essarily involve prediction error minimization, but here
we focus on predictive coding because it has been by far
the dominant account considered by the extant neuro-
physiological literature.
2. Top-down signals represent sensory predic-
tion.
3. At each level of the cortical hierarchy there are
two functionally distinct neural subpopula-
tions representing predictions and prediction
errors.
4. Prediction error minimization is achieved
through reciprocal exchange of error and
prediction signals across levels—a process
known as “hierarchical inference.”
In the last 5 years, methodological advances and
the increasing reach and influence of PP in the neu-
rosciences have prompted a significant surge in the
number of neurophysiological investigations seek-
ing to definitively test these claims. Here, we seek
to offer a balanced overview and critical analysis of
the current state of the evidence, highlighting some
of the key studies that exemplify recent progress in
the field (see Figs. 2–6).
Hypothesis 1: Error-signaling neural
responses to sensory stimuli should scale
inversely with expectation
The vast majority of neurophysiological investi-
gations of PP have centered on the proposal that
error-signaling neural responses to sensory stimuli
should scale inversely with expectation. Much of
what has been considered the core evidence for
PP comes from experiments that test for three
basic phenomena: vigorous neural responses to the
omission of an expected stimulus (the “omission
response”), the suppression of neural activity fol-
lowing repeated stimulus presentations (“repetition
suppression”), and the suppression of neural activ-
ity following stimuli that are expected on the basis
of statistical regularities or prior cues (“expectation
suppression”). Aswewill see in this section, research
in this domain has relied heavily on noninvasive
recording methods that provide population-level
measures of brain activity. This is potentially
problematic because, in many instances, PP makes
opposite predictions regarding the impact of a given
experimental manipulation on expectation versus
error unit activity and it is not clear how these dis-
tinct modulations should manifest in global neural
responses. Although this is not a reason to dismiss
the neural phenomena reported in this section, it is
an important caveat when relating them to PP.
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Omission responses
Perhaps the most compelling example of the puta-
tive prediction error signal is the robust neural
response elicited by the omission of an expected
stimulus42–48 (see Ref. 42 for a review). Importantly,
rather than being generic surprise responses, sev-
eral studies have identified omission signals that are
feature-selective. For example, omission responses
in primary visual cortex have been shown to be
retinotopically specific and exhibit comparable
feature specificity with the responses that are
evoked when the stimulus is presented.49 Although
PP can comfortably accommodate prediction error
signals being elicited in the absence of any sensory
input, such omission responses do not appear
easy to reconcile with feedforward models that
are devoid of any predictive influence on sensory
processing41 (but see Ref. 50). However, PP’s inter-
pretation of the omission response also suffers
from some ambiguities. For example, if prediction
is simply subtracted from bottom-up activity, the
prediction error response to the omission would
require negative firing rates (see “Evidence of pre-
diction in sensory processing” section). This has
led some to suggest that omission responses may
predominately reflect the activity of expectation
units rather than error units.37 Indeed, it might be
hypothesized that the omission response is com-
posed of activity in expectation units representing
the sensory prediction of the absent stimulus51–53
and the error response to the mismatch with those
expectations. Thus, while the observation of neural
responses to unexpected stimulus omissions pro-
vides evidence for the role of prediction in sensory
processing, further research is required to work out
their precise neurophysiological origins.
Repetition suppression
RS has been consistently reported across a wide
range of methodologies, sensory modalities, stim-
ulus properties, and time scales.54,55 Although
it accords neatly with PP,27 an equally plausi-
ble interpretation of RS is that it arises from
low-level changes in the responsivity of stimulus-
selective neurons (i.e., neural adaptation).56 Thus,
the key test for PP models is not whether RS
occurs, but whether its occurrence can be directly
attributed to expectation. An influential early study
by Summerfield et al.57 sought to control for the
effects of adaptation by comparing blood oxygen
level—dependent (BOLD) activity in the fusiform
face area (FFA) of human participants in response
to stimulus repetitions that were expected ver-
sus unexpected, and found that expected repeti-
tions yielded substantially smaller BOLD responses.
Numerous subsequent functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI), magnetoencephalography
(MEG), and electroencephalography (EEG) studies
have reported modulations of RS by the probabil-
ity of a repetition45,46,58–67 (i.e., expectation) (but see
Refs. 68–70). Also consistentwith PP, and seemingly
at odds with neural adaptation accounts, is evidence
that unexpected repetitions evoke greater neural
responses than frequent alternations.37 However,
as we will discuss in more detail below (Hypoth-
esis 4), PP asserts that expectations due to stimu-
lus repetition and those due to knowledge of stim-
ulus probability emanate from distinct processing
levels. Grotheer and Kovacs61 implemented orthog-
onal manipulations of face repetition and repeti-
tion probability, noting that studies potentially con-
found the effects of repetition and expectation on
sensory signals by manipulating the relative prob-
ability of repetitions and alternations across blocks.
They observed independent, additive effects of each
in FFA, the occipital face area, and the lateral occip-
ital complex (LOC).
Attempting to replicate the findings of Sum-
merfield et al.57 with single-cell recordings in
macaque IT, Kaliukhovich and Vogels71 reported
that responses to deviant stimuli were indis-
tinguishable from responses to infrequent, but
conditionally probable, stimuli. However, it is
unclear to what extent this discrepant result
reflects certain methodological differences. First,
Kaliukhovich and Vogels used stimuli that were
unfamiliar to the monkeys, but some human stud-
ies indicate that RS expectation effects are most
pronounced for stimuli that are highly familiar
to the observer59,61 (e.g., letters or faces; but see
Ref. 63). Second, the task demanded only passive
fixation rather than attentional engagement, which
has been shown to strongly affect the modulation
of RS by expectation.60 Third, Kaliukhovich and
Vogels recorded from IT, while Summerfield et al.
measured activity in FFA. To address these issues,
Vinken et al.72 recorded neural activity in response
to face stimuli in the middle lateral face patch
(ML), a macaque homolog of FFA. Once again,
they failed to observe any evidence of an effect
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of repetition probability on RS in single-unit or
multiunit activity, even when the repetitions were
task-relevant and repetition probability was found
to affect the monkeys’ behavior. However, Vinken
et al. measured responses from ML, which is char-
acterized as having view specificity rather than
identity specificity.73 As alternate stimuli had a dif-
ferent identity, but a similar viewpoint, these stimuli
may not have optimally differentiated “expected”
and “unexpected” responses. Importantly, the
results from both Vinken et al. and Kaliukhovich
and Vogels were presented as single population
analyses, which would also obscure any functional
heterogeneity among individual neurons represent-
ing error units or expectation units. Thus, it remains
an open question if the effects of RS are a conse-
quence of perceptual expectations,27,55 but the fact
that PP can accommodate RS as a purely low-level
phenomenon27 suggests that RSmay not represent a
useful vehicle for definitively adjudicating between
PP- and feedforward/adaptation-based accounts.
Expectation suppression
A substantial body of work has also sought to
test PP predictions pertaining to expectation sup-
pression (ES) using a variety of paradigms (e.g.,
predictive cues, paired associations, and predictable
stimulus sequences). As with RS, ES has been con-
sistently reported in human brain imaging studies
across sensory modalities and noninvasive neural
recording techniques45,46,74–81 (but see Ref. 82) and
a number of human studies have demonstrated
that the magnitude of stimulus-evoked responses
is inversely proportional to the degree to which
the stimulus was expected75,76,83,84 (see Refs. 47
and 85 for corresponding evidence from neuronal
recordings in rodents and monkeys, respectively).
A key observation from this work has been that
the observed neural modulations are not generic to
broad categories of stimuli, but specific to individu-
ally predicted exemplars. For instance, Pajani et al.70
observed ES in FFA BOLD activity in response to
specifically predicted facial identities relative to
nonpredicted faces.
Although many of the above studies could not
segregate the distinct contributions of error and
expectation units to the observed global neural
response modulations, some studies have applied
alternative experimental designs and method-
ologies that were tailored to do so. Egner et al.76
examined BOLD responses to face and house stim-
uli that were either expected or unexpected, and
observed effects consistent with ES in FFA. The
authors also made the surprising observation that,
despite its well-established role in face processing,86
FFA responses to faces and houses were statisti-
cally indistinguishable when those stimuli were
expected. The full pattern of effects was best
explained by a PP model in which BOLD responses
were dominated by strong prediction-driven, face-
selective expectation unit activity and weak face-
selective error unit activity on both trial types (since
houses would evoke minimal error signals from
face-selective cells). Another fMRI investigation
by de Gardelle et al.87 attempted to isolate activity
attributable to each subpopulation when examin-
ing RS. The authors hypothesized that activity in
expectation units should be enhanced as repetitions
generate increasingly precise sensory expectations,
while error units should exhibit RS as these pre-
dictions eradicate prediction error. Consistent with
these predictions, two segregated clusters of FFA
voxels were found to exhibit either RS or repetition
enhancement. Although the authors demonstrated
that the classification of each voxel was stable across
measurements, the inevitable intermingling of the
proposed expectation and error unit populations
within each 3-mm cubic voxel is a limitation of
this approach. For example, Auksztulewicz and
Friston27 point out that increased expectation-
linked activation of a given voxel cannot be reliably
attributed to expectation unit activity because the
same trend could arise if prediction error units in
that voxel had been assigned increased precision-
weighting as the task statistics are learned.
A series of single- and multiunit recording stud-
ies have also reported evidence of ES in macaque IT
neurons.85,88–92 These effects were sensitive to tran-
sitional statistics (e.g., the transition from Stimulus
A to Stimulus B being more probable than from
B to A),90,91 persisted after controlling for RS,88,89
and emerged at early latencies (∼150 ms).88,90–92
For example, Bell et al.88 recorded single-unit
activity from IT neurons while monkeys performed
a delayed match-to-sample task in which they
indicated which of two stimuli (a face or a fruit)
best matched a previously displayed cue stimulus
that was degraded by noise. They measured the
effect of stimulus probability on IT responses by
manipulating the relative probability of the cue
5Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2020) 1–27 © 2020 The Authors. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of New York Academy of Sciences
Neural evidence for predictive processing Walsh et al.
being a face or a fruit, which changed unpredictably
over the course of the recording session. The results
showed a reduced population response to expected
faces in face-selective IT neurons, which Bell et al.
interpreted as evidence that IT neurons encode
prediction errors and long-term probabilistic
information, in line with PP. Although many of
these invasive ES studies are subject to the same
criticism of failing to segregate expectation unit
and error unit activity as the studies from the RS
literature, the analyses of Bell et al.88 did identify
two distinct populations underlying the recorded
activity (see Hypothesis 3), with the ES effect
evident in the putative error unit subpopulation
specifically.
However, Vinken and Vogels93 showed that
this reduced response in IT neurons could be
reproduced in a simulated population of neu-
rons through stimulus-specific neural adaptation
without recourse to PP mechanisms. The authors
simulated a population of neurons displaying
stimulus-selective responses that decreased with
each presentation of a preferred stimulus and recov-
ered between presentations, allowing suppression
to build up over time. This build-up of suppression
over time ultimately accounted for the putative ES
effects, indicating that they could be explained by
passive adaptation mechanisms;93 although there
has been subsequent debate as to whether the long
time window over which adaptation operates in
the simulations is realistic given previous empirical
observations.94 The picture is further complicated
by the fact that a number of direct recording studies
have produced the opposite pattern of results to
Bell et al., with unexpected or random stimuli
eliciting reduced responses relative to expected or
neutral stimuli in macaque IT95,96 and rodent V152
(see Ref. 97 for corresponding results in a human
study). There is also conflicting evidence regard-
ing whether IT neurons are sensitive to statistical
regularities present in nonadjacent stimuli from
a sequence of images91 or whether these suppres-
sion effects are determined by the immediately
preceding stimulus.89,96
Precision and attention
One promising avenue for disentangling PP and
adaptation-based accounts arises from PP’s specifi-
cation that the magnitude of expectation effects on
neural activity depends on the precision-weighting
applied to particular error signals. To efficiently
minimize prediction error, the system adjusts
the precision-weighting assigned to prediction
error according to the estimated reliability of sen-
sory information. Hence, the amplitude of error
responses will reflect both differences in top-down
predictions and differences in predicted preci-
sion. Indeed, as mentioned above, many studies
have reported that stimulus-evoked responses are
inversely proportional to the degree to which the
stimulus was expected,47,75,76,83–85,98 although this
effect is not universally observed.79,82
In PP, stimulus salience and attention are con-
sidered emergent properties of this precision-
weighting mechanism.9,28 Here, attending to a
stimulus feature or to a part of the visual field is
equivalent to predicting high-precision informa-
tion from the associated error units and hence
upweighting their error signals’ influence in sub-
sequent revisions of perceptual hypotheses. This
is consistent with the results of numerous studies
that report larger neural responses to attended
compared with unattended stimuli.99–101 Although
this finding is easily reconciled with the traditional
feedforward account of attention, PP diverges
from this account in proposing an interaction
between attention and expectation. Characterizing
the nature of this interaction has proven difficult
because the experimental designs found in much
of the earlier research confounded attention and
expectation3 and the heterogeneity of results from
subsequent efforts to independently manipulate
these variables precludes any conclusive resolution.
For example, the prominent interaction model
suggests that the error response to expected stimuli
should be amplified for attended, but suppressed
for unattended, stimuli, while the reverse should be
true for unexpected stimuli.102,103 Although several
reports are consistent with this pattern,102,104,105
others have found that ES is abolished in the absence
of attention,60,106,107 or that attention provides an
equivalent boost to predicted and unpredicted
stimuli.77 Hsu et al.108 argue that the source of these
conflicting results may be the distinction between
unpredicted and mispredicted. They found that
the response suppression evident in comparisons
of predicted and mispredicted stimuli showed no
modulation by attention. However, when com-
paring responses with predicted and unpredicted
stimuli, attention reversed ES.
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Hypothesis 1: Summary and conclusions
Although many studies report the expectation-
related neural modulations that are predicted by PP
across the full range of neurophysiological record-
ing techniques, a significant contingent failed to
replicate these effects. For instance, there is a clear
disparity in the frequency with which expectation-
related modulations are detected using global
measures compared with direct neuronal record-
ings. The uncertainty surrounding the relationship
between the neural activity preferentially recorded
with invasive versus noninvasive assays54 also hin-
ders efforts to integrate observations across the
literature. In addition, this summary of the recent
literature highlights considerable variation in the
paradigms that have been employed. For instance,
while some studies instill expectations by allowing
subjects to learn stimulus probabilities through
exposure (e.g., Ref. 66), others train subjects for
days (e.g., Ref. 92); some manipulate baseline
probabilities (e.g., Ref. 63), others manipulate tran-
sitional probabilities (e.g., Ref. 90); some engage
attention (e.g., Ref. 45), others involve passive view-
ing (e.g., Ref. 71); some inform subjects about the
manipulation of conditional probabilities (e.g., Ref.
81), others do not (e.g., Ref. 57). This methodolog-
ical heterogeneity precludes direct comparisons
across studies since PP makes divergent predictions
regarding the properties of prediction error given
different permutations of these variables.
Another source of uncertainty in interpreting
these effects arises from the fact that there is no
consensus about precisely which components of
neural activity are being suppressed by expecta-
tion (see Ref. 4 for a recent review). Although
some studies have reported that expected stimulus
representations are dampened,69,79,90,92,105,109–111
others have found that this global suppression is
attributable to the suppression of neurons tuned
away from the expected stimulus feature, while
the representation of the expected stimulus is
actually sharpenedc.78,88,112 Interestingly, Marques
et al.113 recently found that while backward inputs
from rodent lateromedial visual area (LM) to V1
cWhen interpreting these results, it should be noted that
these decoding analyses of global BOLDactivity or single-
unit responses did not segregate activity from the pro-
posed error unit and expectation unit populations.
were retinotopically matched on average, they also
divaricated widely beyond the target receptive field,
relaying distal visual information. In fact, half of
V1 inputs from LM had receptive fields displaced
more than 24° from their target in V1 and these
axons increasingly targeted cells with the opposite
tuning profile as the retinotopic distance between
the LM and V1 cells increased, betraying a complex
circuitry that would be difficult to uncover using
global measures of brain activity. Additionally, as ES
is typically calculated by comparing expected and
unexpected stimulus responses, it is often unclear
if it represents genuine suppression, suppression
relative to the enhanced response to deviant stim-
uli, or both.55,88,96 For example, Kaposvari et al.89
provided evidence of both: an early transient sup-
pression of the neural response to expected stimuli
and later sustained enhanced activity in response
to unexpected stimuli, reminiscent of a prediction
error response.
A central criticismofmany of the studies address-
ing Hypothesis 1 is the tendency to attribute fluctu-
ations in feature-selective global neural responses
to error signals while overlooking the fact that,
according to PP, expectation units are concurrently
active and undergo distinct modulationsd.34 Within
a PP framework, global measures of neural activity,
such asMEG/EEG and fMRI, will necessarily reflect
a summation of activity from each subpopulation
and the magnitudes of their relative contributions
are not easily derived a priori. This is particularly
important because PP makes opposite predictions
depending on whether activity represents the
transmission of sensory predictions49,82,97,114,115
(enhanced activity) or the integration of these pre-
dictions with bottom-up activity in prediction error
units (reduced activity).45,46,74–81 Although this
problem is not unique to PP, the indefinite profile of
neural activity captured in BOLD activity116,117 and
MEG/EEG signals118 hampers efforts to provide
dispositive evidence of PP in humans.34
However, PP does make a number of more
detailed specifications regarding the architecture of
the inferential circuitry that recent work has begun
dIt should be noted that some have suggested that EEG
recordings will preferentially sample the activity of error
units due to their association with superficial pyramidal
cells (e.g., Refs. 9 and 24; see Hypothesis 3).
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to address. First, PP proposes that predictive signals
carried in descending cortical connections are
responsible for the suppression of prediction error
responses to expected stimuli (Hypothesis 2). Sec-
ond, PP suggests that these signals originate in two
functionally distinct neural subpopulations (error
units and expectation units) and that their activity
should reflect expectations in very different ways
(Hypothesis 3). Third, PP proposes an inferential
hierarchy whereby expectation modulations are not
uniform across the cortex but are selectively applied
at the processing levels to which the expectations
pertain (Hypothesis 4). Thus, the particular neural
populations and processing levels that are prefer-
entially sampled by different recording techniques
may be key to the study outcome. This may account
for the fact that, in several instances, RS/ES effects
that were observed with one noninvasive recording
method were absent in another despite using other-
wise identical paradigms.53,78,119 This issue greatly
complicates efforts to generate precise, empirically
testable PP hypotheses and also reduces the scope
for disconfirmatory results.42 In recognition of
this point, researchers are increasingly seeking to
verify the other hypotheses of PP by attempting to
isolate mechanisms underlying the generation of
predictions and hierarchical inference, and it is to
this literature that we now turn our attention.
Hypothesis 2: Top-down signals represent
sensory predictions
A defining characteristic of PP is a cascade of
descending predictions distributed to each level of
the processing hierarchy to quell emerging predic-
tion error.17 Human and animal studies indicate
that the brain is finely tuned to efficiently extract
regularities from streams of sensory input120,121
through passive sensory experience,52,122 self-
generated actions,123,124 and exploration of the
environment,47,124 and that these expectations
influence sensory processing.45,74,78,125,126 Although
many agree that feedback plays an essential role in
myriad sensory processes,127,128 the neural instan-
tiation of these influences is more controversial. As
outlined in the preceding section, the vast majority
of studies examining PP have tended to focus on
prediction error responses, but a number of recent
studies have also sought to probe the nature of
neural prediction itself.
Evidence of prediction in sensory processing
Devising experimental paradigms that can isolate
stimulus-specific prediction signals from other
coincident neural activity is far from straightfor-
ward. One creative approach has been to exploit
the Kanisza illusion in which “Pac-Man” shapes are
rotated to manipulate the perception of an illusory
triangle (Fig. 3B) in order to probe for prediction
responses in the absence of any bottom-up input.
In a departure from much of the work described
above, these predictions emerge from the interpre-
tation of a currently viewed stimulus rather than
being based on experimentally controlled stimulus
probabilities. Employing the Kanisza paradigm,
Kok and de Lange129 observed increased BOLD
activity in regions of V1 and V2 retinotopically
mapped to the illusory triangle contours. How-
ever, it is not clear whether this activity should
be interpreted as representing error unit activity
arising from the absence of sensory input where
triangle contours are expected or prediction unit
activity reflecting the perceptual hypothesis itself.34
Single-unit recording studies have indicated that
neural responses to illusory contours reflect the
descending influence of higher-level areas.130,131
For example, while both macaque V1 and V2 neu-
rons respond to the illusory contour of a Kanizsa
triangle, V2 neurons consistently respond earlier
than those in V1.130 Several fMRI studies have also
reported that patterns of neural activity evoked in
early visual cortex following the omission of an
expected stimulus resemble the activity evoked
by the veridical stimulus49,51,132 and this result
has been replicated in recordings from rodent
V1.52 Muckli et al.132 occluded a subregion of a
visual scene and isolated neural activity in voxels
retinotopically mapped to this area of the visual
field (Fig. 6B). In line with the idea that predictive
signals descend from higher-level processing areas,
they observed that the classification performance of
their decoding analysis was robust to 2° shifts in the
visual scene, suggesting that this backward activity
originates in neurons with larger receptive fields.
Elsewhere, several studies have offered evidence
that sensory predictionmay also rely on representa-
tions of stimulus trajectories leading into the future.
For example, Bendixen et al.43 played participants
a series of pairs of identical tones and, in certain
instances, omitted either the first or second tone
in a pair. Omission responses were only observed
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when the identity of an omitted tone was known
in advance of its omission (i.e., the second tone of
the pair was omitted; see also Ref. 44). Also con-
sistent with this aspect of PP, enhanced anticipatory
feature-selective activity preceding high-probability
stimuli compared with low-probability stimuli has
been reported inMEG recordings of visual cortex,53
BOLD activity in FFA,82 and single-unit recordings
inmacaque IT.88 Bell et al.88 andKok et al.53 showed
that a representation of the expected stimulus could
be decoded from neural activity before stimu-
lus onset using multivariate analyses and forward-
modeling, respectively. However, it should be noted
that the prestimulus expectation effects observed by
Trapp et al.82 and Kok et al.53 did not influence the
subsequent stimulus-evoked response.
In another line of research, VanKerkoerle et al.133
trained monkeys to mentally retrace a briefly pre-
sented (150 ms) curve and recorded V1 activity.
Following the disappearance of the curve stimulus,
spiking activity persisted in superficial and deep
layers of V1 in the same retinotopic locations as
the presented contour, suggesting that V1 contains
a persistent trace of recently presented stimuli.
Interestingly, the activity was present up to 600 ms
after stimulus offset and was temporarily erased
by the presence of a visual mask, but reinstated
on mask removal, demonstrating that the activity
could not be explained through iconic memory
mechanisms.133 In a human fMRI study, Ekman
et al.51 repeatedly exposed participants to a dot
stimulus rapidly moving across a screen. Following
the exposure period, a flash of the dot stimulus at
the starting position produced a time-compressed
sequence of BOLD activity across the retinotopic
locations of V1 corresponding to the previously
observed stimulus trajectory. Importantly, this
“preplay” activity was not elicited when the stimu-
lus was flashed at the end point of the moving dot
sequence (Fig. 2). This same phenomenon has pre-
viously been directly observed in the firing activity
of an ensemble of V1 neurons in rodents52,122 and
in macaque V4.134 Gavornik and Bear52 point out
that the temporal specificity of these sequence rep-
resentations are not predicted by Hebbian plasticity.
Chong et al.135 measured V1 BOLD responses to
an apparent motion illusion composed of spatially
separated presentations of a rotating grating. V1
activity was found to contain an interpolated rep-
resentation of an intermediate grating orientation
along the illusory motion trajectory between the
two grating presentation locations. Given that
this intermediate grating was never presented to
participants in the experiment, this result suggests
that the brain reconstructs dynamic object features
in V1, predicting current sensory input based on a
representation of the stimulus trajectory.
Further evidence of neural prediction signals has
been uncovered in research examining the substan-
tial locomotor contributions to activity in rodent
V1. These studies cleverly exploit a divergence
between traditional models of sensory processing
and PP by using self-motion as a proxy for motor-
related sensory prediction.41 Although traditional
feedforward models do not predict a difference in
neuronal responses in early visual areas to visual
flow depending on whether it is self-generated or
externally caused, PP suggests that error units will
signal any deviation between sensory predictions
and sensory input. Indeed, when mice run through
a virtual environment, neural activity in V1 is
significantly modulated by locomotor feedback
carrying information about expected patterns of
stimulation.47,48,124,136 For example, the activity of
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) axons projecting
to rodent V1 has been shown to convey predictions
of upcoming grating stimuli47 or visual flow124
based on the mouse’s movements. The V1 neurons
targeted by these backward connections have been
found to signal the mismatch between predicted
and actual sensory input for their corresponding
region of the visual field, characteristic of PP error
units.48,98 These predictions do not simply modu-
late visual responses but appear to drive the activity
of V1 neurons even in the absence of bottom-
up input.48,136 Moreover, these axonal influences
are found to be experience dependent.47,123,124
For example, Leinweber et al.124 found that this
predictive feedback to V1 came to reflect a new
visuomotor coupling when a mouse was trained
in an inverted virtual environment. Overall, these
studies are not consistent with models characteriz-
ing primary visual cortex as a passive feedforward
filter.128
At the same time, demonstrations of top-down
predictive influences on aspects of sensory process-
ing do not necessarily provide definitive evidence
for PP. For example, although Saleem et al.136
identified a small number of neurons sensitive
to mismatches between input and expectations
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Figure 2. Task schematic and data from Ekman et al. (adapted from Ref. 51). (A) Human participants were repeatedly presented
with a moving dot sequence for 4 minutes. Following this dot sequence, participants were then shown either the starting point
of the sequence or the endpoint, which was briefly flashed on the screen. (B) The starting-point stimulus generated a sequence
of BOLD activity across the retinotopic locations of V1 corresponding to the positions of the actual dot stimulus, which recon-
structed the stimulus sequence in a time-compressed format (i.e., this activity unfolded more rapidly than the response to the
actual stimuli). This “preplay” of the stimulus sequence was not elicited by the endpoint stimulus and was still observed in the
absence of attention. The authors argued that the time-compressed format indicated that this represented automatic predictive
activity and not surprise at the omitted stimuli. Enhanced activity in hMT indicated that this activity is fed back from higher-level
regions.
in V1, they found that the feedback modulation
of the wider V1 population was better accounted
for by a positive linear weighted sum of sensory
input and predicted input than by prediction error.
In addition, PP mismatch responses are typically
considered to be the product of a simple subtrac-
tion (error = actual input – predicted input), but
this scheme would appear to necessitate negative
firing rates for omitted stimuli or for weaker than
expected sensory inputs. In fact, several rodent
studies have observed just such a response to an
expected but omitted stimulus.47,48,98,123 Keller and
Mrsic-Flogel41 accommodated the representation
of signed prediction errors by proposing that PP
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is subserved by two classes of error unit: positive
error units (excited by bottom-up sensory sig-
nals and inhibited by top-down prediction) and
negative error units (with the opposite mapping).
However, a recent study by Spratling137 showed that
simulations using an alternative PP model,2 which
uses division rather than subtraction to calculate
error, better fit the neurophysiological data derived
from these rodent studies than either Rao and Bal-
lard’s original model18 or Keller and Mrsic-Flogel’s
revised model.41
The development of prediction
According to PP, the range of interpretations of
sensory stimulation entertained by the perceptual
system is constrained by prior experience. Some
priors can be bestowed through phylogenetic devel-
opment and hardwired into neural structure,138
while others will emerge from persistent regu-
larities in natural sensory experience and will
likely be instantiated in the tuning properties of
sensory cortex.4,19,139 For example, the prevalence
of cardinal orientations in the sensory environ-
ment is reflected in the more narrow tuning and
overrepresentation of neurons selective for car-
dinal orientations in early visual areas.140 Berkes
et al.141 found that spontaneous activity in ferret
V1 becomes increasingly consistent in response
to natural scenes over the course of development,
indicating that the visual system converges on a
response shaped by prior sensory experience.
Nonetheless, such consistently reinforced
priors appear malleable in the face of new
experience,6,142,143 which suggests they may be
represented both in the architecture of sensory
cortex and in more dynamic, context-sensitive
top-down influences. In this way, priors based on
recent patterns of stimulation or current context
can also influence sensory processing,2,144–147 even
when regularities are embedded in complex natu-
ralistic stimuli.139 For example, Li and Di Carlo148
designed a paradigm that exploited the fact that
object representations in IT are robust to changes
in viewing angle. As monkeys freely viewed a
monitor, an image of an object was presented 3°
displaced from their retinal position. When the
monkey spontaneously saccaded to the image, the
identity of the object was alternated during saccade
execution. Subpopulations of neurons that initially
exhibited a postsaccadic response preference for the
first object identity, came to incorporate both object
identities equally after repeated exposure, which
is consistent with the idea of a flexible predictive
model capable of updating stimulus expectations to
reflect sensory regularities.
Several rodent studies have provided evidence
that predictive activity emerges over the course
of exposure to statistical regularities in visual
stimuli47,52,124 (see also Ref. 88 for single unit
recording in monkeys) and that this correlates with
the magnitude of prediction error responses.47,123
In line with PP’s precision-weighting mechanism,
there is also evidence from auditory studies in
humans that the inherent predictability of a stim-
ulus stream moderates this process of prediction
generation144,149,150 and subsequent ES.151–153 For
example, Southwell and Chait154 found that the
neural response to frequency outliers was enhanced
when the deviant tones were presented in the
context of a regular pattern compared with a ran-
dom pattern even when the pattern was presented
too rapidly to allow conscious detection of the
regularity.
A particularly perplexing set of results in this
literature comes from a series of studies report-
ing that the transition from random to regular
sequences of auditory stimuli is accompanied by a
sustained increase in neural activity measured with
MEG, EEG, and fMRI,144,154,155 in stark contrast to
ES studies showing dampened neural responses to
predictable stimuli.78,81,156,157 One interpretation of
this result is that the enhanced activity reflects the
high precision-weighting afforded to low variance
input.155 However, since precision-weighting is
applied to error units, this explanation of the sus-
tained error signals rests upon the assumption that
the increased precision more than compensates
for the reduction in prediction error that would be
expected over the course of exposure to a repeating,
and therefore highly predictable, pattern of tones.
Finally, recent studies provide evidence of pre-
diction error updating perceptual hypotheses to
improve future predictions.69,158 For example, Tang
et al.69 applied a forward encoding model to EEG
data in order to measure the orientation selectiv-
ity of visual signals in response to pairs of oriented
Gabors. Unexpected orientations led to increased
orientation selectivity soon after stimulus presenta-
tion and this effect reemerged at later time points,
consistentwith an updating of sensory expectations.
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Overall, this evidence is consistent with PP’s con-
tention that the brain constructs dynamic represen-
tations of regularities in the sensory stream and that
these representations are intimately involved in sub-
sequent sensory processing.144,154,159
Hypothesis 2: Summary and conclusions
Humans are capable of rapidly extracting regu-
larities from the sensory environment144,158,160,161
and there is strong evidence that the resultant
expectations influence sensory processing.154 It is
a substantial achievement to begin to isolate this
predictive activity in recordings of neural activity
spanning human, monkey, and rodent research.
Consistent with PP, neural activity believed to
represent prediction appears to carry stimulus-
specific information, which is heavily experience
dependent, and interacts with bottom-up sensory
input. However, there are many questions still to be
answered. Although significant progress has been
made,4,42,162 the neurophysiological mechanisms
responsible for the extraction of regularities and
the generation of experience-based priors are not
well understood. Although a range of candidate
neural regions have been implicated in track-
ing a variety of sensory regularities and issuing
predictions29,37,40,53,55,75,120,144,158,162 (see Ref. 41 for
a recent review), their precise relationships to the
modulations observed in sensory processing are not
yet established. Finally, it is not clear whether the
formation of sensory predictions is a unitary neural
process or an array of independent, task-tailored
mechanisms.161 Expectations can be formed in
relation to stimulus timing, stimulus location, or
stimulus content,162 and electrophysiological evi-
dence suggests that these kinds of predictions are
instantiated by distinct neuromodulatory mech-
anisms, in dissociable networks and at different
latencies.44,162,163 Similarly, expectations can arise
from arbitrary stimulus pairings,90 predictive cues,
or higher order regularities.66 To what extent these
forms of prediction rely on the same basic neural
mechanisms remains to be determined.
Hypothesis 3: Each level of the cortical
hierarchy houses two functionally distinct
neural subpopulations representing
predictions and prediction errors
A central postulate of PP is that prediction error
minimization is coordinated between two func-
tionally distinct prediction and error unit subpop-
ulations, which propagate signals across different
frequency bands and cortical layers.9,40,42 However,
it is only very recently that empirical research has
directly addressed this hypothesis.
Functionally distinct units
A corollary of PP’s specification of two distinct
subpopulations is that neurons encoding expec-
tations should not encode prediction error and
vice versa. Indeed, studies of primate and rodent
neuroanatomy indicate that forward and back-
ward projections originate from separate cell
populations,164,165 as PP requires. As we have seen,
some fMRI studies have attempted to account
for these subpopulations in their analyses (e.g.,
Refs. 76 and 87), but ultimately, BOLD responses
will not adequately segregate their output as each
voxel would contain an uncertain mixture of
error and expectation units. More compelling evi-
dence of functionally distinct subpopulations has
been acquired through examination of single-unit
recordings. For example, Bell et al.88 found no cor-
relation between the activity of a subset of neurons
that encoded stimulus probability (i.e., prediction)
and a subset that encoded prediction errors in
macaque IT. Also in line with the predictions of
PP, neurons that responded most strongly to faces
showed the greatest difference in responses between
expected and unexpected face trials, a characteristic
of error units. Fiser et al.47 observed a similar result
using calcium imaging to record neural activity
in layer 2/3 of mouse V1 while the mice explored
a virtual tunnel with oriented gratings (A or B)
spaced out along the walls. They identified a group
of V1 neurons, resembling expectation units, that
exhibited orientation-selective activity in antici-
pation of an upcoming grating over the course of
exposure. Another group of neurons, resembling
error units, exhibited stimulus-evoked activity that
was selective for a particular orientation and this
selectivity was not substantially altered by expe-
rience. When an unexpected grating was shown
in the final location, expectation neurons fired
as if the predicted grating had been presented,
while the activity of the orientation-selective error
neurons was driven by the actual stimulus. Strong
feature-selective predictive activity was associated
with greater suppression of activity in error neurons
with corresponding stimulus preferences in trials
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where the stimulus matched expectations. Con-
versely, when expectations were violated, stronger
predictive activity preceded enhanced error unit
responses. In line with the precision-weighting
mechanisms described by PP, Fiser et al.47 reported
that the strength of predictive activity in V1 neu-
rons and ACC axons projecting to V1 was greater as
themouse approached a position where the identity
of the grating stimulus was reliably stable compared
with a position where its identity varied. Finally,
when the stimulus in the final position was omitted,
a strongV1 responsewas observed and the response
strength positively correlated with the strength of
the preceding predictive activity. In fact, several
studies of locomotor feedback in rodents have iden-
tified subpopulations of V1 neurons that signal the
magnitude of the mismatch between expected pat-
terns of visual flow and actual sensory input.48,123,124
Such activity profiles are consistent with PP and dif-
ficult to explain in terms of pure feedforward drive.
Laminar segregation
The laminar segregation of bottom-up and top-
down activity is an established feature of cortical
anatomy.164 Forward signals are primarily trans-
mitted from superficial to middle layers, while
backward connections terminate in superficial and
deep layers (Fig. 3A).166–168 The recent advent of
high-resolution neuroimaging has made it possible
to exploit this laminar architecture to dissociate
putative prediction and error signals in human
subjects. Using 7T fMRI, Kok et al.169 found selec-
tive increases in activation of the deep layers of
V1 induced by illusory figures associated with
a Kanisza triangle, while dampened activity was
observed in regions of superficial and middle layers
of V1 associated with the encoding of the Pac-Man
inducers that resembled the laminar profile of
genuine bottom-up stimulation. This appears to
accord well with PP: expectations are relayed from
higher-level areas to deep layers of V1 and the
Figure 3. (A) The laminar segregation of feedforward and feedback connections between human lateral geniculate nucleus, V1,
andV2. According to PP, expectation units are expected to primarily occupy deep cortical layers, while error units should be found
in superficial layers (adapted from Ref. 214). (B) Kok et al.169 presented participants with a Kanizsa illusion while recording their
BOLD response with 7T fMRI. The task is well poised to isolate prediction signals because the bottom-up sensory input is the
same whether the illusory triangle is presented or not. (C) Data fromKok et al. demonstrating the pattern of BOLD activity across
different cortical layers in response to a Kanizsa triangle illusion and its “Pac-Man” inducers. The results showed significantly
enhanced activity in deep layers ofV1 corresponding to the illusory triangle,which could be interpreted as representing the activity
of expectation units signaling the presence of the illusory triangle. There was also evidence of suppressed activity in middle and
superficial layers of V1 where the Pac-Man inducers fell within the receptive fields. This response suppression exhibited the same
laminar profile as the response to a checkerboard stimulus (adapted from Ref. 169).
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error units’ response to the predictable inducers
is suppressed in the same layers as the response to
the actual visual stimuli (Fig. 3C). However, it is
not clear why the absence of bottom-up sensory
input at the location of the illusory contours did
not itself evoke a prediction error response in the
superficial and middle layers. In another high-
resolution fMRI study, Muckli et al.132 showed that
only the superficial layers of V1 were significantly
activated by a subregion of a visual scene that had
been occluded (Fig. 6B). The fact that no subjects
exhibited significant activity in the midlayers,
where forward information peaked, suggests that
this activity may represent descending predictions
about the omitted scene. Interestingly, however,
there was little evidence of a representation of the
scene in deep layers where expectation units are
thought to predominate. Although these studies
demonstrate the promise of laminar fMRI as a
novel means of investigating PP, neither can be said
to offer concrete (dis)confirmatory evidence.
Oscillations
In the primate visual system, signals transmitted
forward through hierarchical levels are expressed
in theta-band (4–8 Hz) and gamma-band (>30 Hz)
activity, while backward signaling is carried out
through beta-band activity (12–30 Hz).42,170 PP
associates this oscillatory segregation between
forward and backward processing171 with the
distinct subpopulations housing error and expec-
tation units, suggesting that oscillatory signatures
of error and prediction message passing should
be dissociable.40,42,172 Consistent with the pro-
posed laminar profile of PP dynamics, evidence
from monkey and human studies indicate that
gamma-band activity predominantly emanates
from forward projections in superficial layers,
while descending activity, carried by alpha/beta-
band activity, is strongest in layers 5/6.40,170,173–175
Studies that have sought to test PP’s characteri-
zation of oscillatory message passing have found
that when a stimulus is expected, beta power
gradually builds in the lead up to stimulus onset,
and gamma activity is reduced when those expecta-
tions are realized.45,176,177 Conversely, the violation
of expectations is typically associated with increases
in gamma power, while beta oscillations are initially
reduced before resynchronizing.172 For example,
Arnal et al.84 found that audio–visual mismatches
evoked increased gamma activity in auditory
cortex, which scaled with the strength of the pre-
dictive information. Fujioka et al.178 reported that
beta-band activity diminished after each beat of a
rhythmic tone and reached a peak just before the
next beat, suggesting it may be entrained to the
tempo of the beat. When the tone was omitted, the
beta-band activity did not decrease, perhaps reflect-
ing the recalibration of temporal inferences, and a
sudden peak in gamma-band activity was observed.
A number of other studies have provided evi-
dence consistent with the idea that gamma- and
beta-band activity constitute prediction error and
expectation signals, respectively. For instance,
analyses of Granger causality by Richter et al.179
indicated that top-down beta-band activity target-
ing macaque V1 enhanced subsequent, spatially
specific, stimulus-driven ascending gamma-band
signals from V1 to V4 in a manner consistent with
precision-weighting mechanisms invoked by PP.
Similarly, Sedley et al.180 recorded local field poten-
tials using electrocorticography (ECoG) in three
human subjects listening to auditory sequences
with occasionally deviant fundamental frequencies.
They demonstrated that human gamma-band activ-
ity showed a positive correlation with an estimate of
precision-weighted prediction error derived from a
Bayes-optimal model, while beta-band activity cor-
related positively with a model estimate of predic-
tion updating. A recent study by Chao et al.158 iso-
lated three components in macaque ECoG record-
ings of novelty responses in an auditory paradigm,
whereby both established local and global regulari-
ties can be respected or violated (Fig. 4). They iden-
tified two gamma-band components that closely
matched model estimates for lower- and higher-
level prediction error signals, as well as a beta-band
component interpreted as a prediction update sig-
nal. When both local and global regularities were
violated, the strength of the prediction update sig-
nal significantly affected the lower- and higher-level
prediction error signals on the subsequent trial.
When just the global regularity was violated, pre-
diction update signals only influenced higher-level
prediction error signals on the next trial. Chao et al.
interpreted these findings as evidence that oscilla-
tions of distinct frequency channels transmit signals
from expectation and error units across the cortical
hierarchy. However, there are also some notable
discrepancies between these studies. For instance,
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Figure 4. Experimental paradigm and resulting data from Chao et al. (adapted from Ref. 158). (A) Chao et al. used an audi-
tory local–global paradigm, whereby local and global regularities could be respected or violated, to investigate the dynamics of
oscillatory activity in macaque monkeys using ECoG recordings. Let us assume the standard (expected) sequence is xxxxY. If the
sequence presented to the subject is xxxxY, “Y” represents a local deviant (differing from the preceding tone, but not the global
pattern). If the sequence played was xxxxx instead, the final “x” represents a global deviant (differing from the global pattern, but
not the local pattern). (B) The results showed three components that closely matched model estimates for a low-level prediction
error, a higher-level prediction error, and a prediction update signal. The low-level prediction error was associated with an early
gamma-power increase over primary auditory cortex and was elicited by unpredicted local deviants. The higher-level prediction
error was composed of a late phase gamma-power increase over anterior temporal cortex and was elicited by local and global
deviants. Finally, the prediction update component was represented by a late beta-power decrease over prefrontal cortex, which
followed the higher-level prediction error, and was associated with unpredicted local and global deviants. The authors found that
when both local and global regularities were violated, the activation of the prediction update signal significantly affected activation
levels of the low-level prediction error and higher-level prediction error on the subsequent trial. When only the global regularity
was violated, the prediction update component’s activation only influenced the higher-level prediction error on the next trial.
Sedley et al. reported a positive relationship
between beta power and prediction updates,
whereas Chao et al. found that prediction updates
were associated with a reduction in beta power.
Additionally, Sedley et al. associated prediction
precision with alpha-band activity, while Richter
et al. linked enhanced precision to elevated beta-
band influences.
Other auditory studies have not observed these
distinct oscillatory signatures or have reported
conflicting findings. Using ECoG recordings, El
Karoui et al.181 found that local deviants (i.e., a tone
differing from the preceding tone in a sequence;
see Fig. 4A) evoked high-gamma responses in
temporal cortex, consistent with previous studies,
but global deviants elicited sustained decreases in
beta activity. However, as the task in this study
was to identify global deviants, it is difficult to
ascertain how much of this effect is attributable to
prediction and how much to changes in attention.
Todorovic et al.45 found greater gamma power
for unexpected tone repetitions and unexpected
omissions, but unexpected repetitions also elicited
greater power in low frequencies (5–9 Hz). In a
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subsequent study, Todorovic et al.106 found that
beta activity decreased after unexpected tones, like
Chao et al., but only in the absence of attention.
If gamma-band oscillations represent the output
of error units, unpredictable deviants would be
expected to provoke strong gamma-band activity,
while predictable deviants should elicit a more
muted response. Although Durschmid et al.182 did
find that high-gamma (>60 Hz) responses dif-
ferentiated between unpredictable and predictable
deviant tones at frontal sites, unpredictable and pre-
dictable deviants elicited equivalent high-gamma
activity over temporal cortex.
Hypothesis 3: Summary and conclusions
PP’s specification of distinct neural subpopulations
firmly divorces the theory from traditional mod-
els of sensory processing but also raises a critical
methodological hurdle for those seeking to test its
tenets. As highlighted above (Hypothesis 1), the
question of distinct neural subpopulations presents
a serious complication for the interpretation of
global, noninvasive brain recording data and, there-
fore, in this section we have considered single-unit
recording studies that have attempted to dissoci-
ate these subpopulations. In fact, this issue also
presents significant challenges for direct recording
studies: if prediction and error units do exist, then
definitively testing PP hinges on first ascertaining
their prevalence in the sampled population. Acquir-
ing recordings from distinct cortical layers, whether
directly or indirectly, may be essential to overcom-
ing many of these obstacles and adding to what is
currently a limited evidence base supporting the
existence of functionally distinct subpopulations
(e.g., Refs. 47 and 98).
Although the assignment of forward and back-
ward pathways to superficial and deep layers
respectively is likely an oversimplification,172,183
there is evidence that where these streams lie in
adjacent layers, or even within the same layers,
they remain segregated.164 There is also evidence
of a segregation of prediction and error process-
ing into oscillatory bands, but this finding is not
universal and some of the discrepancies in the
literature are difficult to reconcile.42 Moreover, it
is not known precisely what kind of information
is carried in these channels and there is little work
describing their mutual influences.158 Further-
more, while gamma- and beta-band activity have
been proposed to support PP mechanisms, other
frequency channels may also contribute to this
activity.172,180 Indeed, if PP is a canonical com-
putation, all frequency channels would represent
some form of inferential processing. Finally, it
should be noted that while the presence of sub-
populations of error and expectation units is a
necessary characteristic of PP, the laminar and
oscillatory asymmetries are also compatible with
alternative functional architectures (e.g., Ref. 168)
and even vary across some implementations of PP
(see Ref. 103).
Hypothesis 4: Prediction error
minimization is achieved by an
inferential hierarchy
As the sections above outline, many studies have
identified expectation-related modulations of neu-
ral activity that are consistent with PP. However,
a central contention of PP models is that percep-
tual processing is coordinated by an inferential
hierarchy.17 This hierarchy allows regularities
at different spatiotemporal scales to exert an
influence at an appropriate level of processing,
funneling processing toward an internally consis-
tent, globally coherent representation with each
iteration. Top-down influences are increasingly
recognized as an integral component in early sen-
sory processing,41,128,184–187 but the contention
that these hierarchical dynamics represent predic-
tion error minimization has rarely been explicitly
tested.
One avenue for investigating such a framework
is to consider the relative latencies of expecta-
tion effects. PP suggests that RS occurs because a
repeated stimulus becomes expected and, therefore,
RS and ES are framed as arising from a common
mechanism but one that is applied at distinct lev-
els of the processing hierarchy.27 Although ES is
characterized as a higher-level effect, sensitive to
complex regularities over extended periods of inte-
gration, RS is considered an automatic expression of
low-level prediction error minimization, sensitive
to simple, transitional statistics.55,188 Consistent
with PP, numerous studies using MEG/EEG, fMRI,
andECoG show thatwhile local deviants and simple
regularities (e.g., repetitions) modulate early phases
of neural responses, evidence of sensitivity to more
complex sensory inference (e.g., global deviants
and ES) emerges at later latencies.46,69,81,158,181,189–193
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Accordingly, early responses to local deviants are
typically confined to primary sensory cortex, while
violations of complex regularities evoke activity
across distributed, higher-level areas (e.g., Ref. 182;
see Ref. 42 for a review). However, it is not clear
to what extent these effects can be interpreted as
confirmation of a hierarchical PP network.42 For
example, there is substantial uncertainty about
what exactly RS represents27,72,194 and PP and adap-
tation offer apparently indistinguishable accounts
of expectation-independent RS effects. Therefore,
the observation that repetition- and expectation-
related suppression arise from lower and higher
levels of the cortical hierarchy cannot be taken as
definitive support for PP.
Although there is evidence that the predictabil-
ity of a stimulus modulates activity in low-level
sensory areas103,128 and alters the functional con-
nectivity between neural regions associated with its
processing,75,83,155,195 efforts to trace the diffusion
of these effects across the processing hierarchy
have produced mixed results.60–62,67,79 For example,
Utzerath et al.67 found evidence of RS, ES, and an
interaction between expectation and repetition in
area LOC. No evidence of RS, nor an interaction
between repetition and expectation, was observed
in V1, while ES was only detected in right V1.
However, it is not clear that predictions about the
kinds of complex object images used in these stud-
ies should be expected to suppress activity at the
earliest stages of sensory processing (Fig. 6D).
There is also a reasonable concern that stimuli
labeled “unexpected” are often better described as
“less expected.” In the Utzerath et al. paradigm, the
stimulus pool was composed of just four stimuli and
the “unexpected” transitions occurred in 25% of
trials. Given the limited range of outcomes, it may
be that the stimulus probabilities had a marginal
effect on processing and the associated early visual
responses.
Another intriguing question raised by PP is
how does a higher-level area, with its own stim-
ulus preferences, communicate predictions about
activity at a preceding level of the hierarchy with
distinct response properties? Recent invasive neural
recordings have attempted to capture the unfold-
ing of these hierarchical interactions over time.
Schwiedrzik and Freiwald92 sought to identify
signatures of this process across three levels of
the macaque face-patch system, having trained
monkeys to associate nine pairs of face stimuli
with differing facial identities and head orien-
tations. These three areas are distinguished by
their increasingly abstract stimulus preferences:
ML, whose neurons exhibit viewpoint specificity;
AL, which is characterized by mirror-symmetric
response preferences (i.e., profile-selective); and
AM, which is tuned to view-independent stimulus
identity.73 Since minimizing the error response to a
view violation may require only the revision of sen-
sory expectations at the lowest level of the hierarchy,
these errors might be expected to be resolved more
quickly than those requiring updates to higher-level
predictions. Indeed, the results showed that ML
responses to simple violations of head orienta-
tion diminished more quickly than more complex
stimulus violations involving discrepant facial iden-
tities (Fig. 5). In addition, the authors found that
mirror-symmetric view violations produced
smaller responses in ML than nonmirror-
symmetric violations in the late phase of the
response. Together, these results could be inter-
preted as evidence that early responses reflect the
local tuning properties of error units, while activity
in the later phase of a response represents the
involvement of higher-level areas (AL) in the reso-
lution of more complex prediction errors. However,
an important detail of this study is that the deviant
stimulus pairings were not coded according to the
departure of the second face from the expected
second face but as the departure of the first face
from the normal predictor of the second face.
Because the deviant predictor stimuli would, on
a subset of trials, also predict a different view to
that which appeared, many of the trials coded as
“identity violations,” could be classed as “identity
and view violations,” which may offer an alternative
explanation for the similarity between the average
response to these trial types. Moreover, some of
the trials in the “view violation” condition required
predictors that were not among the pool of trained
predictor stimuli and may therefore have failed to
evoke any specific expectations.
In another study, Issa et al.196 pointed out that
PP also diverges from other accounts in predict-
ing enhanced activity over time from low-level
error units that prefer the presented stimulus fea-
tures, when the stimulus conflicts with sensory
predictions from higher levels. To test this, they
simultaneously recorded neuronal activity from
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Figure 5. The macaque face processing system in IT and prediction error responses elicited from its constituent cortical areas
(this figure was adapted from Ref. 92). (A) The macaque face processing network is composed of three face-selective areas,
each with its own functional specialization, arranged in a three-level processing hierarchy. Although tuning to head orientation
decreases from areaML via area AL to area AM, selectivity for facial identity across head orientations increases.73 (B) Schwiedrzik
and Freiwald92 recorded single-unit activity in ML in response to learned face pairs, where occasional deviant stimuli had a dif-
ferent identity, head position, or both. Although all three violations individually produced a significant early prediction error
response, the late sustained response to orientation violations dwindled and disappeared, but the response to identity and com-
bined violations remained significant. These findings suggest that early responses reflectmismatches along local tuning properties,
but later responses reflect view-invariant identity errors. Mirror-symmetric view violations evoked smaller prediction errors in
ML than nonmirror-symmetric violations in the late phase. As the timing of this effect overlaps with the peak ofmirror-symmetric
identity tuning inAL, this suggests that higher order representations are involved in suppressing prediction errors in the late phase.
(C) However, the interpretation of these results is complicated by the coding scheme where the deviant stimuli were successors to
untrained predictors rather than unexpected successors to trained predictors.
three hierarchical levels of the macaque face pro-
cessing system while presenting typical and atypical
configurations of macaque facial features. The
results showed that neurons in lower-level face-
selective subregions of IT increasingly responded to
atypical configurations of facial features in the late
phase of the response, while the higher-level area
maintained a preference for typical facial config-
urations throughout. Furthermore, the late-phase
response in the lowest level was better predicted by
the early response in higher levels than the lowest
level itself, consistent with the idea that updated
sensory expectations are distributed from higher
levels to resolve lower-level error responses. Issa
et al. went on to show that these hierarchical neural
dynamics could not be captured by feedforward
models incorporating lateral inhibition, normaliza-
tion, or additional excitatory feedback representing
Bayesian inference, but were consistent with a PP
model describing the lower-level late-phase activity
as a prediction error response.
According to PP, the conditional probabilities
afforded by higher-level representations may be
exploited to constrain lower-level sensory rep-
resentations, promoting contextual congruence
across levels of the hierarchy.4,132 Indeed, there is
evidence that the neural representation of simple
stimulus features is influenced by higher-level
object representations115,129 and object represen-
tations are modulated by scene context.197 For
example, Harrison et al.198 found that the global
coherent motion of a random-dot kinematogram
produced diminished responses in V1. Importantly,
the constituent dots were deliberately spaced to
extend beyond the classical receptive field of a V1
neuron, thus excluding lateral interactions as a
potential explanation of this contextual suppres-
sion. Similar to the paradigm used by Issa et al.,
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Figure 6. Examples of stimuli used to probe the nature of sensory prediction. (A) Mooney images used by Hsieh et al. (adapted
from Ref. 199). The two tone image becomes interpretable when the full greyscale image is seen. (B) An occluded visual scene
used by Muckli et al. (adapted from Ref. 132). Their analyses were conducted on V1 neurons whose receptive field fell within the
occluded region. (C) An illustration of the structure-from-motion stimulus used byMurray et al.115 (D) Expected and unexpected
stimulus pairs used by Utzerath et al. (adapted from Ref. 67).
Hsieh et al.199 compared BOLD responses in early
visual cortex with Mooney images (Fig. 6A) before
and after human subjects recognized the stimulus
as a meaningful image. They reported that when
subjects could interpret what the two-tone image
represented, the response to this stimulus more
closely resembled the response to a full grayscale
version of the same image than the response to the
identical two-tone image before it was interpretable.
Similarly, others have found that the grouping of
moving stimulus elements into a perceptual object
is associatedwith increased activity in area LOCand
suppressed activity in lower-level areas hMT and
V1 (Fig. 6C).114,115 This observation accords with a
predictivemodel in LOC transmitting its perceptual
hypothesis to lower-level areas to quell prediction
error. Interestingly, these studies demonstrate pre-
diction effects that complement those observed
by Utzerath et al. in the same brain regions (see
above). One explanation for a more modest effect
of ES in V1 observed by Utzerath et al. compared
with the robust effects reported by Murray et al.115
and Fang and He114 is that the conditions in these
studies differed in terms of the presence or absence
of a high-level perceptual hypothesis rather than
in terms of a more differential effect of expectation
(75% likely versus 25% likely). Disrupting activity
in V1/V2 and area LOC using transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS), Wokke et al.187 found
that the critical window for disrupting a Kanizsa
illusion was earlier in LOC than V1/V2, suggesting
early influences from backward connections play
an essential role. Similarly, V1 activity represent-
ing an apparent motion illusion (e.g., Ref. 125) is
influenced by early feedback from MT,200 and the
detection advantage associated with targets pre-
dicted by the apparent motion trace is eliminated
by applying TMS to MT before target onset.186
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Hypothesis 4: Summary and conclusions
Many studies that identify expectational modu-
lations of neural activity struggle to demonstrate
systematic effects across contiguous levels of the
hierarchy (e.g., Ref. 78). However, as mentioned
above, this may be partly due to the fact that it is
highly challenging to establish precisely what, if any,
predictions may be applied at a given processing
level. For example, complex stimuli like faces may
not yield any specific predictions at the level of detail
pertaining to the simple stimulus preferences of V1
receptive fields.67,79 Indeed, most of the studies that
report PP-like dynamics in V1 use simple stimuli
like gratings or flashes.51,78,107,135,201 PP’s stance
on this problem is somewhat unclear. PP does not
predict that the evidence for perceptual inference
should be modular, siloed in an area of the brain
specialized for the particular stimulus in question.
However, more work is needed to understand
how sensory predictions might be conveyed across
processing levels41 and to demarcate the extent to
which predictive activity should be detectable as
one moves away from those specialized processing
hubs.202
Overall, there is good evidence that the sensory
brain is hierarchically organized and that it exploits
descending predictive activity to render sensory
signals into meaningful constructs. However, the
evidence for a PP inferential hierarchy specifically
is scarcer. Although this may reflect on the veracity
of the theory, it may also be attributable to the
great difficulty such a task poses.161 It is not suffi-
cient to demonstrate that descending connections
to early areas introduce contextual modulations
that are essential for perception because this is
accommodated by traditional models of visual
processing (e.g., Ref. 131). What is required are
further demonstrations of PP dynamics unfold-
ing across simultaneous recordings from multiple
cortical areas, such that the hierarchical interplay
of prediction error and prediction can be verified
(e.g., Ref. 196). Efforts to increasingly approximate
this standard of evidence may also shed light on the
important question of how different neural areas
communicate prediction in meaningful ways.203
Discussion
Traditional theories of perceptual processing
have failed to adequately explain why sensory
cortices are infused with masses of descending
connections.10,32,204 For example, backward projec-
tions from V2 to V1 are 10 times more numerous
than forward projections from the lateral geniculate
nucleus to V1205 and the processing of ascending
sensory signals is estimated to account for only
1–2% of the brain’s energy consumption.117 Con-
versely, PP provides a satisfying explanation of these
copious backward connections, impugning their
consignment to mere recurrent modulations in
feedforward schema.183,206 The explanatory power
of this framework, exemplified in simulations of
PP that readily account for phenomena ranging
from V1 neuron response properties207 to bistable
perception29 to perceptual illusions,30,31 has led
some to argue that everything the brain does can
ultimately be explained in terms of prediction error
minimization.9,17,32 Such a bold contention has
inevitably drawn skepticism, much of which has
centered on the theory’s empirical foundation.
Without question, PP can comfortably accom-
modate many neurophysiological observations in
research examining the role of expectation in per-
ception. But, in reality, few studies have set out to
explicitly test hypotheses that are unique to PP and
many empirical observations interpreted as sup-
porting PP are derived fromparadigms ill-equipped
to discriminate among competing models. A key
goal of this review was to highlight a number
of recent neurophysiological investigations that
have leveraged novel paradigms and technological
advances in order to put PP to the test. Although on
the whole it must be concluded that the empirical
support for each of PP’s key hypotheses is mixed,
there is much work yet to be done and it is striking
that clear-cut counterevidence has yet to emerge.
In fact, a common criticism of PP is that it is very
difficult to falsify.34 PP’s specification at the level
of an algorithm can be seen as a virtue, providing
a framework for the integration of explanations
at multiple levels from synapse to processing
hierarchy,7,208 but it can also pose a challenge as
researchers seeking to test the theory’s validity con-
front the often murky translation from algorithm
to biophysical implementation. Indeed, critiques
of the standard implementation of PP,18 focusing
on the model’s biological plausibility (e.g., neu-
rons with both positive and negative firing rates),
have spawned numerous alternative versions with
revised circuitries and diverging predictions.2,41
Confusion can sometimes arise where it is not
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clear which of these various incarnations are being
tested in a particular study. In addition, the flex-
ibility conferred on PP models by hypothesizing
functionally distinct neural subpopulations and
layering a precision-weighting mechanism on their
responses at every level of the hierarchy renders
the theory capable of accommodating apparently
contradictory results.34
A necessary next step, therefore, is to provide
definitive evidence of the existence of expectation
and error units in neural processing. Although
this represents a considerable challenge using
conventional paradigms and neurophysiological
techniques, methodological advances in high-
resolution fMRI, optogenetics, calcium imaging,
and serial single-unit recordings at multiple levels
of the processing hierarchy are providing power-
ful new opportunities to trace neural markers of
hierarchical PP dynamics.41,128,158,196,209,210 Pairing
these increasingly sophisticated neural assays with
anatomical models, computational modeling, and
simulations137,211 will enable researchers to derive
fine-grained a priori hypotheses and compare
model evidence for variant architectures and also
for near-variant ones that share much with the core
PP picture but differ in their conceptions of the
encoding, flow, or use of prediction errors (e.g.,
Refs. 2, 10 and 11; see Ref. 137). As the theory is
refined by these more delicate neurophysiological
tests we hope to see a bridging of the gaps between
parallel literatures that currently exist somewhat in
isolation212 (e.g., perceptual decision making).
Although the debate about PP’s empirical
grounding is currently unsettled, the theory can
nevertheless be regarded as a milestone in cog-
nitive neuroscience, spurring efforts to recognize
the importance of backward connections in the
architecture of the neocortex and the role of pre-
diction in sensory processing.206,213 Does PP reflect
a questionable commitment to bringing multiple
phenomena under a single unifying umbrella—one
thatmay not be able to do full justice to any of them?
Or can a mature PP capture the full sweep of behav-
ioral effects and experimental data, revealing them
as flowing from a core rationale expressed using a
handful of repeated processing motifs? Whatever
the outcome, this is a lively and ever-expanding lit-
erature that allows us to revisit many long-standing
assumptions regarding neural function, the nature
of mind, and the origins of human behavior.
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